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Intercept Behavior Analysis of Industrial Wireless
Sensor Networks in the Presence of Eavesdropping
Attack
Yulong Zou, Senior Member, IEEE, and Gongpu Wang
Abstract—This paper studies the intercept behavior of an
industrial wireless sensor network (WSN) consisting of a sink
node and multiple sensors in the presence of an eavesdropping
attacker, where the sensors transmit their sensed information to
the sink node through wireless links. Due to the broadcast nature
of radio wave propagation, the wireless transmission from the
sensors to the sink can be readily overheard by the eavesdropper
for interception purposes. In an information-theoretic sense, the
secrecy capacity of the wireless transmission is the difference
between the channel capacity of the main link (from sensor to
sink) and that of the wiretap link (from sensor to eavesdropper).
If the secrecy capacity becomes non-positive due to the wireless
fading effect, the sensor’s data transmission could be successfully
intercepted by the eavesdropper and an intercept event occurs
in this case. However, in industrial environments, the presence
of machinery obstacles, metallic frictions and engine vibrations
makes the wireless fading fluctuate drastically, resulting in the
degradation of the secrecy capacity. As a consequence, an optimal
sensor scheduling scheme is proposed in this paper to protect the
legitimate wireless transmission against the eavesdropping attack,
where a sensor with the highest secrecy capacity is scheduled to
transmit its sensed information to the sink. Closed-form expres-
sions of the probability of occurrence of an intercept event (called
intercept probability) are derived for the conventional round-
robin scheduling and the proposed optimal scheduling schemes.
Also, an asymptotic intercept probability analysis is conducted
to provide an insight into the impact of the sensor scheduling
on the wireless security. Numerical results demonstrate that the
proposed sensor scheduling scheme outperforms the conventional
round-robin scheduling in terms of the intercept probability.
Index Terms—Intercept behavior, industrial wireless sensor
networks, sensor scheduling, intercept probability, Nakagami
fading.
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W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) were initially mo-tivated by the military for battlefield surveillance [1],
and now are further developed for various industrial applica-
tions such as the assembly line monitoring and manufacturing
automation for the sake of improving the factory efficiency,
reliability, and productivity [2], [3], which are referred to as
the industrial WSNs [4]-[6]. In industrial applications, the real-
time communications among the spatially distributed sensors
should satisfy strict security and reliability requirements [7].
The failure of ensuring the security and reliability of the
sensed information transmissions may cause an outage of the
production line, a damage of the factory machine, or even the
loss of workers’ lives. Moreover, in industrial environments,
the machinery obstacles, metallic frictions, engine vibrations
and equipment noise are hostile to the radio propagation
and certainly adversely affect the performance of wireless
transmissions.
In industrial WSNs, due to the broadcast nature of radio
propagation, the wireless medium is open to be accessed by
both authorized and unauthorized users, leading WSNs to be
more vulnerable to the eavesdropping attack than wired sensor
networks, where communicating nodes are physically con-
nected with wire cables and a node without being connected
is unable to access for illegal activities. To be specific, as
long as an eavesdropper hides in the industrial WSNs, the
legitimate wireless transmissions among the sensors can be
readily overheard by the eavesdropper, which may decode
its tapped transmissions and violate the confidentiality of the
sensors’ information communications [8]. Therefore, it is of
importance to investigate the protection of industrial WSNs
against the eavesdropping attack.
Traditionally, the cryptographic techniques were exploited
to protect the wireless communications against eavesdrop-
ping, which typically rely on secret keys and can prevent
an eavesdropper with limited computational capability from
intercepting the data transmission between wireless sensors.
However, an eavesdropper with unlimited computing power is
still able to crack the encrypted data communications with the
aid of exhaustive key search (known as the brute-force attack)
[9], [10]. Moreover, the secret key distribution and agreement
between the wireless sensors exhibit numerous vulnerabilities
and further increase the security risk. To this end, physical-
layer security is emerging as a promising paradigm for secure
communications by exploiting the physical characteristics of
wireless channels, which can effectively protect the confi-
dentiality of communication against the eavesdropping attack,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 2
even with unlimited computational power [11].
The physical-layer security work was pioneered by Shannon
in [12] and extended by Wyner in [13], where an information-
theoretic framework was established by developing achievable
secrecy rates for a classical wiretap channel model consisting
of one source, one destination and an eavesdropper. In [14],
the so-called secrecy capacity was shown as the difference
between the channel capacity of the main link from source
to destination and that of the wiretap link from source to
eavesdropper. If the secrecy capacity becomes non-positive
(i.e., the channel capacity of the main link becomes less
than that of the wiretap link), the eavesdropper will succeed
in intercepting the source message and an intercept event is
considered to occur in this case [15], [16]. This implies that
increasing the secrecy capacity can effectively decrease the
probability that the eavesdropper successfully intercepts the
source message. However, the secrecy capacity of wireless
transmission is severely limited due to the wireless fading
effect. Moreover, the presence of machinery obstacles, metallic
frictions and engine vibrations in industrial environments
makes the wireless fading fluctuate drastically, resulting in a
further degradation of the secrecy capacity.
To overcome this limitation, considerable research efforts
have been devoted to improving the secrecy capacity of the
wireless transmission through the artificial noise generation
[17]-[19]. The artificial noise aided security approaches allow
the legitimate transmitters to generate a specifically designed
interfering signal (called artificial noise) such that only the
eavesdropper is adversely affected by the artificial noise,
while the intended receiver remains unaffected. This leads
to a degradation of the wiretap link in terms of the channel
capacity without affecting the channel capacity of the main
link, resulting in an increased secrecy capacity. In [17] and
[18], the authors considered the use of multiple antennas for
generating the artificial noise and showed that the number of
antennas at the legitimate transmitter should be more than that
at the legitimate receiver for the sake of ensuring that the main
link is unaffected by the artificial noise. Additionally, in [19],
Goeckel investigated the employment of cooperative relays for
the artificial noise generation and demonstrated a significant
security improvement in terms of the secrecy capacity.
It is pointed out that although the artificial noise approaches
in [17]-[19] can effectively enhance the wireless secrecy ca-
pacity, additional power resources are consumed for generating
the artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropper. To this end,
Zou et al. proposed the multiuser scheduling scheme in [20]
for improving the wireless physical-layer security without any
additional power cost and showed the security improvement
of cognitive radio networks in terms of the secrecy capacity
and intercept probability. In this paper, we examine the sensor
scheduling in an industrial WSN consisting of a sink node and
multiple sensors in the presence of an eavesdropper, differing
from the multiuser scheduling for cognitive radio networks
as studied [20]. More specifically, in industrial WSNs, the
wireless channel is complicated due to the machinery obsta-
cles, metallic frictions and engine vibrations. This motivates
us to consider the use of a complex fading model (i.e.,
Nakagami model) for characterizing the industrial wireless
channel, instead of a simpler Rayleigh fading model used in
[20].
The sensor scheduling to be studied in this paper exhibits
some advantages over the conventional relay selection [15],
[16] and the artificial noise methods [17]-[19] in terms of
reducing the system implementation complexity and saving
the power resource. Specifically, in [15] and [16], additional
network nodes were introduced and employed for relaying the
transmissions between the source and destination, which are
refereed to as relay nodes. Given multiple relay nodes avail-
able, the authors of [15] and [16] investigated the relay selec-
tion for wireless security enhancement, where the relay node
that can achieve the highest secrecy against eavesdropping
is chosen as the “best” relay to assist the source-destination
transmissions. Although the relay selection studied in [15] and
[16] improves the wireless physical-layer security, it relies on
additional relay nodes and requires complex synchronization
among spatially distributed relays, resulting in extra system
complexity. In addition, the artificial noise methods were
devised in [17]-[19] to improve wireless security by generating
a sophisticatedly-designed artificial noise for confusing the
eavesdropper only without affecting the legitimate destination.
This, however, costs additional energy resources for the ar-
tificial noise generation, compared to the sensor scheduling,
where a sensor with the highest secrecy against eavesdropping
is scheduled for data transmission without consuming any
additional energy resources. Since wireless sensors are usually
powered with limited batteries, the energy becomes one of
the most precious resources in industrial WSNs, which makes
the sensor scheduling more attractive than the conventional
artificial noise methods from the energy saving perspective.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as fol-
lows. First, an optimal sensor scheduling scheme is proposed
for protecting the industrial wireless transmission against
the eavesdropping attack, where a sensor with the highest
secrecy capacity is selected to transmit its sensed informa-
tion to the sink. The conventional round-robin scheduling is
also considered as a benchmark. Second, closed-form expres-
sions of the intercept probability for the conventional round-
robin scheduling and the proposed optimal sensor scheduling
schemes are derived in Nakagami fading environments. Third,
an asymptotic intercept probability analysis is conducted and
the diversity order of the proposed scheduling scheme is shown
as the sum of Nakagami shaping factors of the main links from
the sensors to the sink. Finally, numerical results show the
advantage of the proposed sensor scheduling scheme over the
conventional round-robin scheduling in terms of the intercept
probability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model of an industrial WSN in the pres-
ence of eavesdropping attack and describes the conventional
round-robin scheduling as well as the proposed optimal sensor
scheduling schemes. Next, in Section III, the closed-form
intercept probability expressions of the conventional round-
robin scheduling and proposed optimal scheduling schemes
are derived in Nakagami fading environments. In Section IV,
we present the asymptotic intercept probability analysis, fol-
lowed by Section V, where the numerical intercept probability
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Fig. 1. An industrial WSN consisting of a sink and N sensors in the presence
of an eavesdropper (e).
comparison between the conventional and proposed sensor
scheduling schemes are presented. Finally, Section VI provides
some concluding remarks.
II. SENSOR SCHEDULING IN INDUSTRIAL WSNS
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an industrial WSN con-
sisting of a sink node and N sensors in the presence of
an eavesdropper, where all nodes are assumed with single
antenna and the solid and dash lines represent the main link
and wiretap link, respectively. Notice that the eavesdropper
of Fig. 1 could be either an illegitimate user or a legitimate
user who is interested in tapping other users’ data information.
For notational convenience, N sensors are denoted by S =
{si|i = 1, 2, · · · , N}. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the presence of
machinery obstacles, metallic frictions and engine vibrations
in industrial environments is hostile to the radio propagation,
which makes the wireless fading fluctuate drastically. We thus
consider the use of Nakagami fading model for characterizing
both the main channel and wiretap channel. It is pointed out
that the Nakagami model is more complex than other fading
models (e.g., Rayleigh fading, etc.), which is widely used in
literature [21], [22].
In the industrial WSN of Fig. 1, N sensors communicate
with the sink using an orthogonal multiple access method such
as the time division multiple access (TDMA) and orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA). When a sensor
(e.g., si) is scheduled to transmit its data to the sink over
a channel (e.g., a time slot in TDMA or an OFDM sub-
carrier in OFDMA), the eavesdropper attempts to intercept
the information transmitted from si. Traditionally, given an
orthogonal channel, a node with the highest data throughput
is typically selected among N sensors to access the given
channel and to communicate with the sink, which aims at
maximizing the transmission capacity without considering the
eavesdropping attack. By contrast, this paper is focused on
improving the wireless physical-layer security with the aid of
sensor scheduling. In order to effectively defend against the
eavesdropping attack, the sensor scheduling should take into
account the channel state information (CSI) of both the main
channel and wiretap channel, differing from the traditional
scheduling method, where only the CSI of main channel is
considered for the throughput maximization. In this paper, we
assume that the CSIs of both the main channel and wiretap
channel are available, which is an assumption commonly used
in the physical-layer security literature (e.g., [14]-[20]).
B. Conventional Round-Robin Scheduling
For comparison purposes, let us first examine the con-
ventional round-robin scheduling as a benchmark, where N
sensors take turns in accessing a given channel and thus each
sensor has an equal chance to transmit its sensed data to
the sink. Without any loss of generality, we consider that si
is scheduled to transmit its signal xi (E(|xi|2) = 1) with
power Pi and rate Ri, where Ri is specified to the maximum
achievable rate (also known as the channel capacity) from si to
the sink, which guarantees that the ergodic capacity is achieved
by the legitimate transmission.
It needs to be pointed out that the sensed information xi
could be different types of data for different sensors. For
example, the N sensors of Fig. 1 may be used to detect
and monitor different aspects of an industrial plant environ-
ment, including the machine motion, temperature, moisture,
pressure, and so on. The sensor data may also be obtained
by exploiting the collaboration between multiple sensors for
distributed state estimation [23]-[25]. Although the sensors
may generate different types of data, their data streams are
assumed with the same priority in accessing the wireless
channel for transmission in this paper. However, in practice,
different data types may have different quality of service (QoS)
requirements. For example, some sensors may have time-
critical data with a strict real-time requirement, which should
be assigned with a higher priority in accessing the wireless
channel than the others. It is of interest to consider different
QoS requirements for different sensor data, which is out of
the scope of this paper and regarded as future work.
Thus, we can express the received signal at sink as
ys =
√
Pihisxi + ns, (1)
where his is a fading coefficient of the main channel from
si to the sink and ns represents the zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance N0. Using the Shannon
capacity formula [12] and (1), we can obtain the channel
capacity of main link from si to sink as
Cs(i) = log2
(
1 +
|his|
2Pi
N0
)
, (2)
where i ∈ S. Meanwhile, due to the open nature of wireless
medium, the eavesdropper can overhear the signal transmitted
from si and attempts to decode xi from its overheard signal.
Following the physical-layer security literature [11]-[20], the
eavesdropper is assumed to have the perfect knowledge of
legitimate transmissions from si to sink, including the coding
and modulation scheme, encryption algorithm and secret key,
except that the source signal xi is confidential. Hence, the
signal overheard at eavesdropper e is given by
ye =
√
Pihiexi + ne, (3)
where hie is a fading coefficient of the wiretap channel from si
to the eavesdropper and ne represents the zero-mean AWGN
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with variance N0. Using (3), we can similarly obtain the
channel capacity of wiretap link from si to eavesdropper e
as
Ce(i) = log2
(
1 +
|hie|
2Pi
N0
)
. (4)
As discussed in [13] and [14], the secrecy capacity is shown
as the difference between the channel capacity of main link
and that of wiretap link. Therefore, in the presence of eaves-
dropping attack, the secrecy capacity of wireless transmission
from si to sink can be obtained as
Csecrecy(i) = Cs(i)− Ce(i), (5)
where Cs(i) and Ce(i) are given by (2) and (4), respectively.
C. Proposed Optimal Sensor Scheduling
This subsection presents an optimal sensor scheduling
scheme to maximize the secrecy capacity of the legitimate
transmission. Naturally, a sensor with the highest secrecy
capacity should be chosen and scheduled to transmit its data
to the sink. Hence, from (5), the optimal sensor scheduling
criterion is given by
Optimal User = argmax
i∈S
Csecrecy(i)
= argmax
i∈S
1 + |his|
2Pi
N0
1 + |hie|
2Pi
N0
,
(6)
where S represents the set of N sensors. It is observed from (6)
that the channel state information (CSI) (i.e., |his|2 and |hie|2)
of each sensor is required for determining the optimal sensor,
which can be obtained by using classic channel estimation
methods [26]-[28]. More specifically, each sensor may first
estimate its own CSI through channel estimation and then
transmits the estimated CSI to the sink. After collecting all the
sensors’ CSI, the sink can readily determine the optimal sensor
and notify the whole network. Thus, in the presence of an
eavesdropper, the secrecy capacity of legitimate transmissions
relying on the proposed sensor scheduling scheme can be
obtained from (6) as
Cproposedsecrecy = max
i∈S
log2

1 + |his|
2Pi
N0
1 + |hie|
2Pi
N0

 . (7)
It is pointed out that the wireless link between any two nodes
of Fig. 1 is modeled as the Nakagami fading channel. Thus,
|his| and |hie| are Nakagami distributed random variables with
respective shape factors mi and ki, which, in turn, leads to the
fact that |his|2 and |hie|2 are Gamma distributed, i.e., |his|2 ∼
Γ(mi,
σ2
is
mi
) and |hie|2 ∼ Γ(ki, σ
2
ie
ki
), where σ2is and σ2ie are
expected values of |his|2 and |hie|2, respectively. Denoting
Xis = |his|
2 and Xie = |hie|2, we can obtain the probability
density functions (PDFs) of Xis and Xie as
fXis(xis) =
1
Γ(mi)
(
mi
σ2is
)mixmi−1is exp(−
mixis
σ2is
)
fXie(xie) =
1
Γ(ki)
(
ki
σ2ie
)kixki−1ie exp(−
kixie
σ2ie
),
(8)
where Γ(·) denotes Gamma function.
III. EXACT INTERCEPT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OVER
NAKAGAMI FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we analyze the intercept probability of the
conventional round-robin scheduling and the proposed optimal
sensor scheduling schemes over Nakagami fading channels.
A. Round-Robin Scheduling
As shown in [15]-[17], when the secrecy capacity becomes
non-positive (i.e., the channel capacity of the main link be-
comes less than that of the wiretap link), the eavesdropper will
succeed in decoding and intercepting the source message and
an intercept event is considered to occur in this case. Hence,
given that si is scheduled to transmit to the sink, the intercept
probability of si-to-sink transmission is obtained from (5) as
P iint = Pr [Csecrecy(i) < 0] = Pr [Cs(i) < Ce(i)] . (9)
Substituting (2) and (4) into (9) yields
P iint = Pr
(
|his|
2 < |hie|
2
)
, (10)
where |his|2 and |hie|2 are Gamma distributed random vari-
ables with respective PDFs shown in (8). Noting that |his|2 and
|hie|
2 are independent of each other and denoting Xis = |his|2
and Xie = |hie|2, we obtain
P iint = Pr (Xis < Xie)
=
∫∫
xis<xie
fXie(xie)fXis(xis)dxiedxis
=
∫ ∞
0
Γ(mi,
mi
σ2is
xie)fXie(xie)dxie,
(11)
where fXie(xie) is given by (8) and Γ(mi, miσ2
is
xie) denotes the
lower incomplete gamma function as given by
Γ(mi,
mi
σ2is
xie) =
∫ mi
σ2
is
xie
0
1
Γ(mi)
xmi−1 exp(−x)dx.
One can observe from (11) that the intercept probability of the
si-to-sink transmission is independent of the transmit power Pi
and noise variance N0, which implies that increasing the trans-
mit power cannot improve the wireless physical-layer security.
This also motivates us to explore new approaches (e.g., sensor
scheduling) for improving the wireless security against the
eavesdropping attack. In the round-robin scheduling scheme,
N sensors take turns in transmitting to the sink and thus the
intercept probability of the round-robin scheduling is the mean
of N sensors’ intercept probabilities, yielding
P roundint =
1
N
N∑
i=1
P iint, (12)
where N is the number of sensors and P iint is given by (11).
It is noted that numerical intercept probability results of the
round-robin scheduling scheme can be readily determined by
using (12).
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B. Optimal Sensor Scheduling
This subsection derives an exact intercept probability of the
proposed optimal sensor scheduling scheme over Nakagami
fading channels. As aforementioned, an intercept event occurs
when the secrecy capacity becomes non-positive. Hence, using
(7), we obtain the intercept probability of proposed sensor
scheduling scheme as
P proposedint = Pr
(
Cproposedsecrecy < 0
)
= Pr

max
i∈S
log2

1 + |his|
2Pi
N0
1 + |hie|
2Pi
N0

 < 0


= Pr
[
max
i∈S
(
N0 + |his|
2Pi
N0 + |hie|2Pi
)
< 1
]
,
(13)
where S denotes the set of N sensors. Noting that for
different sensors i ∈ S, random variables |his|2 and |hie|2
are independent of each other, we can simplify (13) as given
by
P proposedint =
N∏
i=1
Pr
(
N0 + |his|
2Pi
N0 + |hie|2Pi
< 1
)
=
N∏
i=1
Pr
(
|his|
2 < |hie|
2
)
=
N∏
i=1
P iint,
(14)
where P iint is given by (11). So far, we have derived the closed-
form intercept probability expressions of both the conventional
round-robin scheduling and the proposed optimal schedul-
ing schemes in Nakagami fading environments. It is worth
mentioning that although the intercept probability expressions
given by (12) and (14) can be used to conduct numerical
performance evaluation, it fails to provide an insight into the
impact of the number of sensors on the intercept probability.
Therefore, the following section presents an asymptotic in-
tercept probability analysis to characterize the diversity order
performance.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC INTERCEPT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OF
SENSOR SCHEDULING
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic intercept probabil-
ity of both the conventional round-robin and proposed optimal
scheduling schemes.
A. Conventional Round-Robin Scheduling
Let us first consider the conventional round-robin schedul-
ing as baseline. For notational convenience, the average chan-
nel gains of the main link and wiretap link (i.e., σ2is and σ2ie)
are represented by σ2is = αisσ2m and σ2ie = αieσ2e , where σ2m
and σ2e are called the reference channel gains of the main link
and the wiretap link, respectively. Moreover, let λme represent
the ratio of σ2m to σ2e , i.e., λme = σ2m/σ2e , which is referred
to as the main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) throughout this
paper. We will examine the asymptotic intercept probability
as MER λme →∞. Following [15], the diversity gain of the
conventional round-robin scheduling scheme is expressed as
dround = − lim
λme→∞
log(P roundint )
log(λme)
, (15)
where P roundint is given by (12). We first rewrite P iint from (11)
as
P iint = Pr (Xis < Xie)
= Pr
(
Xis
σ2e
<
Xie
σ2e
)
,
(16)
where σ2e > 0 is the reference channel gain of the wiretap link.
Denoting Yis = Xisσ2
e
, Yie =
Xie
σ2
e
, αis =
σ2
is
σ2
m
and αie = σ
2
ie
σ2
e
,
we readily obtain the PDFs of Yis and Yie from (8) as
fYis(yis) =
1
Γ(mi)
(
mi
αisλme
)miymi−1is exp(−
miyis
αisλme
)
fYie(yie) =
1
Γ(ki)
(
ki
αie
)kiyki−1ie exp(−
kiyie
αie
).
(17)
Using the PDFs of Yis and Yie given by (17) and letting
λme → ∞, we obtain (18) at the top of the following page,
where exp(− miyis
αisλme
) = 1 for λme → ∞ is used. Using (18)
and letting λme →∞, we can further rewrite P iint as
P iint =
ζ(mi, ki, αie)
miΓ(mi)
(
mi
αis
)mi
·
(
1
λme
)mi
, (19)
where ζ(mi, ki, αie) is given by
ζ(mi, ki, αie) =
∫ ∞
0
1
Γ(ki)
(
ki
αie
)
ki
ymi+ki−1ie
× exp(−
kiyie
αie
)dyie.
Combining (12) and (19) yields
P roundint =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ζ(mi, ki, αie)
miΓ(mi)
(
mi
αis
)mi
×
(
1
λme
)mi−min
i∈S
mi
·
(
1
λme
)min
i∈S
mi
.
(20)
Substituting (20) into (15) gives
dround = min
i∈S
mi, (21)
which shows that the intercept probability of the conventional
round-robin scheduling decreases exponentially with min
i∈S
mi
as λme → ∞, where mi is the Nakagami shaping factor
of the channel from sensor si to sink. In other words, the
diversity gain of the round-robin scheduling with N sensors is
determined by the sensor with the smallest Nakagami shaping
factor. This also means that upon increasing the number of
sensors, the wireless security of the conventional round-robin
scheduling scheme would not improve, and even degrades.
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P iint =
∫ ∞
0
1
Γ(ki)
(
ki
αie
)kiyki−1ie exp(−
kiyie
αie
)dyie
∫ yie
0
1
Γ(mi)
(
mi
αisλme
)miymi−1is exp(−
miyis
αisλme
)dyis
=
∫ ∞
0
1
Γ(ki)
(
ki
αie
)kiyki−1ie exp(−
kiyie
αie
)dyie
∫ yie
0
1
Γ(mi)
(
mi
αisλme
)miymi−1is dyis
=
∫ ∞
0
1
miΓ(ki)Γ(mi)
(
ki
αie
)ki(
mi
αisλme
)miymi+ki−1ie exp(−
kiyie
αie
)dyie.
(18)
B. Proposed Optimal Sensor Scheduling
In this subsection, we analyze the diversity gain of proposed
optimal sensor scheduling through an asymptotic intercept
probability analysis for λme → ∞. Similarly to (15), the
diversity gain of proposed sensor scheduling scheme is given
by
dproposed = − lim
λme→∞
log(P proposedint )
log(λme)
, (22)
where P roundint is given by (14). Substituting (19) into (14), we
have
P proposedint =
N∏
i=1
[
ζ(mi, ki, αie)
miΓ(mi)
(
mi
αis
)mi]
·
(
1
λme
) N∑
i=1
mi
,
(23)
for λme →∞. Substituting P roundint from (23) into (22) gives
dproposed =
N∑
i=1
mi, (24)
which shows that for λme → ∞, the intercept probability of
proposed optimal sensor scheduling scheme decreases expo-
nentially with
∑N
i=1mi, i.e., the diversity order of
∑N
i=1mi
is achieved by the proposed scheduling scheme. One can
also observe from (24) that the diversity order of proposed
sensor scheduling scheme is the sum of Nakagami shaping
factors mi of the main links from N sensors to sink. Thus,
as the number of sensors N increases, the diversity order of
proposed sensor scheduling scheme increases accordingly. In
other words, increasing the number of sensors can significantly
decrease the intercept probability of the proposed scheduling
scheme. By contrast, the number of sensors even has a negative
impact on the security performance of the conventional round-
robin scheduling, as implied from (21). This further confirms
the advantage of the proposed optimal scheduling over the
round-robin scheduling.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical results on the inter-
cept probability of the conventional round-robin scheduling
and the proposed optimal sensor scheduling schemes. To be
specific, the numerical intercept probability results of the two
scheduling schemes are obtained through using (12) and (14).
The wireless link between any two network nodes in Fig.
1 is modeled by the Nakagami fading channel, where the
Nakagami shaping factors of both the main link and wiretap
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Fig. 2. Intercept probability versus MER λme of the conventional round-
robin scheduling and the proposed optimal scheduling schemes for different
number of sensors with mi = ki = 1.5 and αis = αie = 1.
link are specified to mi = ki = 1.5, unless otherwise
stated. Additionally, the fading coefficients |his|2 and |hie|2
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables, leading to αis = αie = 1.
Fig. 2 shows the intercept probability of the round-robin
scheduling and the optimal scheduling schemes by plotting
(12) and (14) as a function of MER for different number of
sensors N . As shown in Fig. 2, as the number of sensors
increases from N = 2 to N = 4, the intercept probability
performance of the conventional round-robin scheduling re-
mains the same, showing that no security benefit is achieved
by the round-robin scheduling with an increasing number of
sensors. By contrast, upon increasing the number of sensors
from N = 2 to N = 4, the intercept probability of the
proposed optimal scheduling scheme decreases significantly.
In addition, Fig. 2 also shows that for both the cases of N = 2
and N = 4, the proposed optimal sensor scheduling scheme
strictly outperforms the round-robin scheduling in terms of the
intercept probability.
In Fig. 3, we show the intercept probability versus MER
λme of the round-robin scheduling and the optimal scheduling
schemes for different Nakagami shaping factors. One can see
from Fig. 3 that as the Nakagami shaping factors increase from
mi = ki = 1 to mi = ki = 2, the intercept probabilities of
both the round-robin scheduling and the optimal scheduling
schemes decrease significantly. Fig. 3 also shows that for both
mi = ki = 1 and mi = ki = 2, the intercept probability
performance of the proposed optimal scheduling is better than
that of the round-robin scheduling.
Fig. 4 illustrates the intercept probability versus the number
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Fig. 3. Intercept probability versus MER λme of the conventional round-
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Fig. 4. Intercept probability versus the number of sensors N of the
conventional round-robin scheduling and the proposed optimal scheduling
schemes for different MER values with mi = ki = 1.5 and αis = αie = 1.
of sensors of the conventional round-robin scheduling and
the proposed optimal scheduling schemes for different MER
values. It can be observed from Fig. 4 that for both the cases
of λme = 3 and λme = 5, the intercept probability of the
conventional round-robin scheduling keeps unchanged, as the
number of sensors increases. By contrast, with an increasing
number of sensors, the intercept probability performance of the
optimal scheduling scheme is significantly improved, showing
the security advantage of the proposed scheduling approach
over the conventional round-robin scheduling.
Fig. 5 shows the comparison between the exact and asymp-
totic intercept probabilities of the round-robin scheduling and
the proposed optimal scheduling schemes for different number
of sensors N . One can see from Fig. 5 that the intercept
probability of the round-robin scheduling corresponding to
N = 2 is the same as that corresponding to N = 4,
further showing that no security benefit is achieved by the
round-robin scheduling as the number of sensors increases. It
is also observed from Fig. 5 that for both the round-robin
scheduling and proposed optimal scheduling schemes, the
exact and asymptotic intercept probability results match well
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Fig. 5. Comparison between the exact and asymptotic intercept probabilities
of the round-robin scheduling and the proposed optimal scheduling schemes
for different number of sensors with mi = ki = 1.5 and αis = αie = 1.
with each other in high MER region, implying the tightness
of asymptotic intercept probability analysis for λme → ∞.
As shown in Fig. 5, the slopes of intercept probability curves
of proposed optimal scheduling become much steeper, as the
number of sensors N increases from N = 2 to N = 4.
This means that with an increasing number of sensors, the
intercept probability of proposed optimal scheduling scheme
decreases at much faster speed as λme → ∞, confirming
the advantage of exploiting the optimal sensor scheduling for
defending against the eavesdropping attack.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated the use of sensor scheduling
to improve the physical-layer security of industrial WSNs
against the eavesdropping attack and proposed an optimal
sensor scheduling scheme, aiming at maximizing the secrecy
capacity of wireless transmissions from sensors to the sink.
We also considered the conventional round-robin scheduling
as a benchmark. We derived exact closed-form expressions
of the intercept probability for both the conventional round-
robin scheduling and the proposed optimal scheduling schemes
in Nakagami fading environments. An asymptotic intercept
probability analysis was also presented to characterize the
diversity gains of the round-robin scheduling and the optimal
sensor scheduling schemes. Numerical results demonstrated
that the proposed optimal scheduling scheme performs better
than the conventional round-robin scheduling in terms of the
intercept probability. In addition, upon increasing the number
of sensors, the intercept probability of the proposed optimal
sensor scheduling scheme significantly decreases, showing the
physical-layer security enhancement of industrial WSNs.
In the present paper, we only examined the single-antenna
case, where each network node is equipped with the single
antenna. It is of high interest to extend the results of this paper
to a general scenario with multiple antennas for each network
node. Also, we have not considered the QoS requirement in
the sensor scheduling, where all the sensors are assumed with
the same priority and scheduled for data transmissions solely
based on their channel state information without considering
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specific QoS requirements for different sensor data. In practice,
some sensors may have time-critical data with a strict real-
time requirement, which should be assigned with a higher
priority than the others in accessing the wireless channel.
Hence, it is highly necessary to explore the QoS guaranteed
sensor scheduling, attempting to improve the wireless security
while guaranteeing each sensor’s specific QoS requirement.
Additionally, due to the channel estimation errors, it is im-
possible to obtain the perfect CSI knowledge for the sensor
scheduling. It is of thus interest to investigate the impact of
CSI estimation errors on the intercept performance of sensor
scheduling. We leave these aforementioned challenging but
interesting problems for future work.
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